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Abstract: Vietnamese ‘blue boats’ – small wooden-hulled fishing boats – are now entering the territorial waters
of Pacific Island countries and illegally catching high-value species found on remote coastal reefs. Crossing several
international boundaries and traversing a distance of over 5000 km, these intrusions have alarmed Oceanic coun-
tries, including Australia. Lacking administrative capacity as well as jurisdictional authority to effectively control the
vast stretches of island coastlines individually, governments and intergovernmental bodies in the region have called
for strengthened coordination of surveillance efforts while also pressuring Vietnam diplomatically. This paper
reviews these latest developments and is the first to provide a focused assessment of the issue. Through the lens of
Copenhagen School of securitisation theory, we analyse responses of national and regional actors and their por-
trayal in online media to understand how blue boats are constructed as a security threat within a narrative of mari-
time, food and human security. Arguably, Australia together with the Forum Fisheries Agency, who advise on the
governance of offshore tuna resources, have so far acted most decisively – in a way that might see them extend
their strategic role in the region. We propose a comprehensive empirical research agenda to better understand and
manage this nascent, flammable and largely unpredictable inter-regional phenomenon.
Introduction
For the people of the Pacific Islands, fishery
resources found in reefs, lagoons and coastal
sea areas are a crucial part of their sustenance,
contributing to their food and livelihood secu-
rity as well as being a central element in the
Pacific way of life (Johannes, 1978; Gillett
et al., 2000). Spanning over a 6000 nautical
mile stretch of the western and central Pacific
Ocean, the remoteness of these islands, together
with the small land mass and the predominantly
coastal-residing populations further accentuate
the central roles of fish and the ocean. In recent
years, several sightings of poaching fleets from
outside the region have alarmed coastal com-
munities, national governments and inter-
governmental organisations. Referred to as ‘blue
boats’ (or ‘reef robbers’), a flotilla of small-to-
medium-sized fishing boats from Vietnam has
made what must be a long, arduous journey to
target coastal reefs in Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands and other Pacific
countries and territories to collect high-value
species of sea cucumber and giant clam. Poten-
tial impacts of this foreign fishing intrusion are
forecast to be acute and multidimensional,
eliciting widespread attention and a call for
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urgent action by the mainstream media as well as
in the speeches of national and regional actors. At
the local level, poaching of sea cucumber would
directly deplete the inshore resources and deprive
the communities of an export-based, income-
generating opportunity. Such illegal, unreported
and unregulated (IUU) fishing is also an affront to
the efforts communities and national governments
have made towards the management and recov-
ery of these resources, many of which are now
under national bans and/or international protec-
tion (Anderson et al., 2011). In addition, the
occurrence of blue boats glaringly exposes the dif-
ficulty of national governments to monitor and
patrol the vast stretches of coastal waters in the
Pacific (e.g., Aqorau, 2000; McNulty, 2013).
Pacific countries, many of whom qualify as small
island developing states, are typically equipped
with scarce surveillance capacity (Govan, 2014).
Beyond detection, the apprehension and the sub-
sequent legal-administrative treatment of these
boats and the crew can also take several months
and be a resource-intensive operation for Pacific
Island countries (PICs).
Up until now, this emerging Asia Pacific issue
has been mostly reflected in increasing media
attention. While analysis of occurrences and
handling of blue boats have been presented in a
rather bite-sized manner, their media portrayal
has nonetheless resulted in effective issue-mak-
ing. This is typical of a nascent and data-poor
phenomenon; however, there is now a need for
a more reflexive and coherent interpretation
given the varied repercussions the issue could
bring to the region. Such interpretation would
‘turn circumstances into a situation that is com-
prehensible and that serves as a springboard to
action’ that is, ‘sense-making’ (sensu Taylor and
Van Every, 2000: 40; Weick et al., 2005). We
take a discursive point of view to delineate a
narrative about the nature of the threat the
incursions of blue boats pose and the meanings
they generate, in order to inform regional iden-
tity and action. Approaching blue boat incur-
sions as a maritime security issue, this paper
draws on the constructivist analytical frame-
work of the Copenhagen School of sec-
uritisation theory (Wæver, 1995; Buzan et al.,
1998) and evaluates how the acts of fishing
incursion and the responses of various Pacific
actors have been packaged from the perspective
of online media, what purposes these measures
serve, and what (geo)political trends these devel-
opments hold for the future. Overall, we argue
that this issue is en route to being securitised
such that urgency is raised and emergency mea-
sures are legitimised to bolster multilateral coop-
eration on maritime monitoring and surveillance.
In doing so, we also highlight the political nature
of this process, whereby potential for asserting
one’s influence or sovereignty is gained or lost
among various Pacific actors.
This study relied on publicly accessible sec-
ondary sources from 2015 to 2018 and informal
discussions with key informants to conduct a
critical textual analysis (Vaara and Tienari,
2002; Fairclough, 2013). English language arti-
cles that emanated from the various media out-
lets of PICs as well as Australia and New Zealand
represented material used to assemble region-
relevant perspectives. Articles were searched peri-
odically between December 2017 and October
2018 using an online search engine with a com-
bination of keywords, including but not limited to
‘blue boats’, ‘Vietnamese’, ‘Pacific Islands’,
‘poaching’, ‘sea cucumber’ and ‘illegal fishing’.
All results were initially retained and reviewed.
Because the coverage of the same event is often
reproduced by more than one media outlet, any
repetitive reports were omitted from the final set
of articles. We also examined Vietnamese lan-
guage articles to gain a preliminary understanding
of how the issue is framed and dealt with at the
‘source’ location. Eighty-two articles were col-
lected in total (55 in English; 27 in Vietnamese) in
order to reach saturation (see Table S1,
Supporting Information, referenced at the end of
this paper, for a complete list). From this, we iden-
tified key actors and events while extracting state-
ments and quotes particularly useful for
representational purposes, as they are also in line
with the sentiments found throughout the reported
material more generally. Informal discussions with
those in various professional circles encompassed
both open-ended chance conversations and pre-
scheduled chats but with no strict data collection
agenda. The broad understanding gleaned from
these discussions helped contextualise the analy-
sis of the media articles. This work also benefits
from our diverse and extensive research experi-
ences on coastal, offshore and transboundary fish-
eries in the Asia-Pacific, including Vietnam and
PICs. We are open-minded about the blue boat
incidents and have no conflict of interest.
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The paper proceeds with a brief synopsis of
the evolving concept of maritime security. Next,
the history and the traditional content of mari-
time security concerns and actions in the Pacific
are presented. Against this broad context, we
then situate the blue boat incursion and the
threats it would pose to the region. The subse-
quent section describes the occurrences of the
blue boats and the regional and national reac-
tions taken and claimed so far. We then explain
this development through applying the
securitisation framework of Barry Buzan, Ole
Wæver, and colleagues. Finally, we highlight
the implications of the securitisation narrative
surrounding this phenomenon and situate them
within the broader understanding of maritime
security. The paper concludes by proposing a
future research agenda, which can help better
prepare Pacific actors for the likely prospect of
continued threat construction on blue boats.
Maritime security in the Pacific Island region
While it is difficult to achieve a consensus over
definition, maritime security is increasingly
important to international relations and ocean
governance. According to Bueger (2015: 159),
the growing incidence of piracy in the past
decade together with the build-up of blue water
navies of emerging powers such as India and
China and inter-state hostilities in regions such
as the South China Sea have moved maritime
security to the global consciousness and to
high-level policy agendas (see also Ross, 2009).
Traditionally, maritime security has been associ-
ated with military threats and sovereignty viola-
tions of sea-based territory. A greater range of
defence and safety-related goals are now part of
its lexicon including the protection of the free-
dom of navigation and the flow of international
trade as well as averting dangers of terrorism,
drug trafficking, piracy, people smuggling and
other forms of transnational crime (Klein et al.,
2010: 5). Further, threats to a state’s security are
closely linked to environmental, economic and
social conditions. For example, in the 2008
Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations
identified seven specific threats to maritime
security, which included IUU fishing (https://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N08/266/26/PDF/N0826626.pdf). Recognising
food insecurity as a major risk to international
peace, of which fisheries form a vital supply
in many parts of the world (Cohen and Pinstrup-
Andersen, 1999; Pomeroy et al., 2007), this par-
ticular threat also invites human security con-
cerns affecting the vulnerability and resilience
of coastal populations as well as the welfare of
seafaring fish workers (Adger, 2010; Bueger,
2015; Macfarlane, 2017). Likewise, intentional
and unlawful damage to the marine environ-
ment and climate change uncertainty are also
key parts of the maritime security discussion, for
their potential to destabilise social and eco-
nomic interests of coastal states through, for
instance, creating environmental refugees or
derailing the pursuit of the ‘blue economy’,
which requires secure and well-managed marine
environments as a precondition to ocean-based
sustainable development (Klein et al., 2010;
Duarte, 2016; Barnett, 2017; Voyer et al., 2018).
For the 22 PICs and Territories that comprise
the Pacific Island region in the Western and
Central Pacific, the ocean remains a source of
life and prosperity that has sustained Pacific
peoples for generations. Maritime issues for
these countries frequently focus on the health of
the marine environment including coastal
resources that provide food and tourism earn-
ings, the sustainability of offshore fishing stocks
for national income generated from licence
fees, marine pollution from shipping and land-
based activities, the introduction of marine
invasive species, and the social and ecological
impact of climate-change-induced sea-level rise
and destructive weather events. Hence, con-
cerns about maritime security have mainly
reflected these environmental and resource-
related matters rather than the naval, defence-
oriented concerns more prominently discussed
in larger, more developed states (Firth, 2003;
Bateman and Mossop, 2010). Similarly, analysts
have noted that the PICs do not necessarily pri-
oritise the risk of maritime terrorism and piracy
(Fletcher, 2004; Fortune, 2006; Jones, 2009).
This has meant that counter-terrorism measures
have been at times exaggerated or even imposed
by others at the expense of greater attention to
the issues the PICs themselves deem more urgent
(e.g. PICs having to respond to the UN Security
Council resolutions that address terrorism and
strengthened container and port security
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measures). In this regard, Bateman and Mossop
(2010: 101) observed that, ‘increased port security
has had a social cost, as local people are now
denied fishing or other recreational access to
wharves and jetties used by international shipping.’
As part of the traditional ocean-going activity,
fishery and fishing vessels provide a salient
entry point to maritime security discussions in
the Pacific Island region (Martin, 2005;
UNODC [UN Office on Drugs and Crime],
2016). In addition to being a main conduit for
illegal fishing, the possibility that fishing vessels
could be involved in the trafficking of weapons
and drugs and people smuggling has been long
noted. While the security of air access points
has seen significant improvements over the
years (Bateman and Mossop, 2010), control of
seaborne activity is understandably challenging
due to the geographical expanse of the region
(spanning over a marine area of 30 million
square kilometres). This challenge is exacer-
bated by difficulties of inter-country and agency
coordination, which is needed to compensate
for the limited domestic capacity (e.g. shortage
of patrol vessels, surveillance aircraft and oper-
ating costs relative to the size of national mari-
time jurisdictions). Nevertheless, significant
collective efforts have been mustered to address
IUU fishing in the region. Since 1999, the
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) has played a key
role in managing and supporting member coun-
tries in the implementation of a satellite-based
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) to track the
movement of large-scale tuna-catching vessels in
their exclusive economic zones (EEZ). FFA also
administers and provides support for multilateral
treaties that aim to set up a cooperative framework
for region-wide surveillance. For instance, the
1992 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Sur-
veillance and Law Enforcement in the South
Pacific Region (and the 2012-finalised Agreement
on Strengthening Implementation of the Niue
Treaty, i.e. the Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement),
contains provisions on the sharing of resources
and data as well as procedures for flexible cooper-
ation in monitoring, prosecuting and penalising
illegal fishing vessels. Having the potential to
extend its scope to cover a broader range of suspi-
cious activities beyond fisheries, the Treaty also
has the means to facilitate improved coordination
of air surveillance, regarded by some commenta-
tors as the most pressing operational requirement
for regional maritime enforcement (see Aqorau,
2000; Bateman and Mossop, 2010).
The implementation of the Niue Treaty, how-
ever, has been slow and intermittent at best,
marred by complex factors such as a sensitivity
to national sovereignty, particularly when for-
eign (or regionally managed) vessels are
allowed to conduct enforcement operations in
national areas of jurisdiction (Bateman and
Mossop, 2010; see also Radio New Zealand,
2017a). PICs have only gained independence
from Western colonial powers in the second
half of the 20th century, and some only as
recently as the 1990s (e.g. Palau). Hence, will-
ingness to cooperate closely with other actors
can be affected by ‘a perception that the state is
giving up something seen as a sovereign right,
or natural sphere of influence’ (Bateman and
Mossop, 2010: 111). Concerns about sover-
eignty have also influenced the relationship of
PICs with Australia and New Zealand – the two
larger, more advanced ‘metropolitan’ states in
the region (e.g. see Murray and Overton, 2011).
Australia and New Zealand, in part driven by
their own national interests to secure a ‘peace-
ful’ Pacific (i.e. free of resource depletion, trans-
national crime and terrorism risks) have
identified a need for improved maritime security
and devoted significant resources to increase
the infrastructural and bureaucratic capacities
(e.g. patrol boats and training of government
officials) of the PICs to respond to ocean-based
threats (Rolfe, 2003; Fortune, 2006; Hayward-
Jones, 2015). However, the sense that metropol-
itan countries are at times ‘seeking to impose
their will and to establish arrangements that suit
them rather than the PICs’ has not gone
unnoticed in the region (Bateman and Mossop,
2010: 111), with Fortune (2006: 59) also stating
that ‘most PICs are uncomfortable addressing
what New Zealand and Australia regard as the
most serious security challenges’. This antago-
nistic dynamic that exposes differences of prior-
ities has been similarly observed in the western
Indian Ocean, where national Somalian actors
have tended to attach more importance to the
aspects of blue growth and human security
while external donors have stressed anti-piracy
or counter-terrorism activities (Bueger and
Edmunds, 2016).
Such challenges are reflective of the general
problem of coordination and cooperation that
© 2019 The Authors. Asia Pacific Viewpoint published by Victoria University of Wellington
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needs to be addressed in order to institute an effec-
tive maritime security regime (Bueger, 2013). In
the following section, we explore how blue boats
are providing additional impetus for strengthening
regional security and interdependence. More
specifically, we analyse the ways in which the
nascent phenomenon of the blue boat incursion
is subject to processes of ‘securitisation’, enrolled
to promote added urgency to bolster the security
rationale.
Blue boats in the Pacific
Blue boats and their operation
Blue boats are a label given to fishing boats
from Vietnam that have been spotted poaching
high-value sedentary species in the remote
coastal reefs of the Pacific Islands. Blue simply
because of the painted colour of the hull which
is in fact very typical of fishing boats in Viet-
nam, these are relatively small boats of
10–15 m in length, which can carry 10–17 crew
onboard. First making headlines in 2015, the
blue boats have now been sighted (and
apprehended) in the waters of many PICs
including Palau, the Federated States of Micro-
nesia (FSM), Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia as well as
Australia. They travel more than 7000 km and
stay up to three months at sea, allegedly
enabled to stay those durations by the
suspected logistical arrangement of tranship-
ment carriers arriving to receive the caught fish
and provide fuel in the course of their trip
(Blaha, 2016). Between December 2014 and
September 2016, the FSM seized more than
nine Vietnamese vessels and arrested approxi-
mately 169 crew members (Carreon, 2017a). In
Australian waters, according to the Australian
Fisheries Management Authority, the number of
foreign fishing boats caught operating illegally
is reported to have increased from six in 2014
to up to 20 in 2016 with most originating from
Vietnam and Indonesia (Field, 2017).
Sea cucumber appears to be the main target
of blue boats. Two blue boats intercepted in the
waters of New Caledonia in November 2017
were found to be carrying on board 10 tons of
gutted and salted sea cucumber in 58 barrels
(Carreon, 2017b). As sea cucmber is a culturally
important delicacy in many parts of East and
Southeast Asia including Hong Kong and main-
land China, its harvest and export to these Asian
markets are integrated into an efficiently oper-
ated market chain (Purcell, 2014; Barclay et al.,
2016; Fabinyi et al., 2017). Concurrently, nota-
ble patterns of over-exploitation similar to
boom-and-bust cycles followed by harvest or
export bans in countries such as Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have
been evident (Anderson et al., 2011; Hair et al.,
2016). Tropical sea cucumber species can retail
(as a dried or processed product called bêche-
de-mer) at AU$150–300 per kg in Hong Kong
and Chinese markets (Purcell et al., 2018) pro-
viding a considerable financial incentive for
blue boats operators whose wooden-hulled
boats represent a relatively small investment
(reportedly costing around AU$15 000–35 000
each) (Blaha, 2016). Furthermore, consumer
demand in China is expected to rise in line with
the growing middle class (Fabinyi et al., 2017).
The growing encroachment of blue boats into
the Pacific may also be driven by depletion of
fish stocks in waters nearer to Vietnam in the
South China Sea (Pomeroy et al., 2009). In addi-
tion, fishing in these traditional fishing grounds
has been made more problematic by Chinese
political and para-military interferences (Dupont
and Baker, 2014; Zhang and Bateman, 2017).
Since the late 1990s, the Vietnamese Govern-
ment has implemented strategies that encourage
outward expansion of its fishery by limiting
nearshore fishing and subsidising construction
of bigger vessels capable of venturing to off-
shore waters (Pomeroy et al., 2009). In
searching for new areas to operate, the intrusion
blue boats intrude into the waters of to the
Pacific Islands and Australia; this is part of the
wider trend that sees them also in the waters of
neighbouring countries, such as the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Blue boats
purportedly travel through unpatrolled marine
routes whenever possible, and look for
uninhabited islands to scour the surrounding
area for sea cucumber; the boats then move fur-
ther towards inhabited islands in search of more
(Phòng, 2017, translated). Collection of sea
cucumber in foreign waters is apparently easier
and less dangerous in operational terms, too,
since sea cucumber is still found 6–7 m deep,
whereas one must dive 60 m, and even 80 m in
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waters near Vietnam in the South China Sea
(Voice of America, 2017a, translated). Mr Phan
Huy Hoàng, President of Fisheries Associations
of Quang Ngai Province, from which the
highest incidence of blue boats originate, has
portrayed the operation thus: ‘with a small
wooden fleet, fishers turn off communication
equipment and turn off the lights as well. They
keep moving quietly. No one monitors, no
means can detect them … People are willing to
be hung to get the 300-time higher profits, just
like drug trafficking’ (in Hoàng, 2017, trans-
lated). Participating in such a journey is a pre-
carious undertaking with potentially dire
consequences. Crews reportedly have no con-
tract of employment and no insurance; and
when there is a problem such as occupational
accidents or arrests, the owner assumes no
responsibility and even cuts off all ties with the
fishers (Voice of America, 2017b, translated). It
is also possible that some of the crew are vic-
tims of human trafficking conducted by the
owners of the blue boats, although such claims
remain unsubstantiated at time of writing
(Buchanan, 2017).
Impacts and responses
Poaching of coastal marine resources, such as
sea cucumber, can directly endanger the liveli-
hood security of coastal communities and a sig-
nificant source of national export revenue in the
Pacific (Gillett, 2009). Sea cucumber fisheries
are estimated to be the second-most valuable
export fishery for the PICs after tuna, and more
live tonnage in sea cucumbers is extracted and
traded annually than all other reef fisheries
combined (Carleton et al., 2013; Gillett and
Tauati, 2018). Sea cucumber are often a pri-
mary source of income for the fishers who par-
ticipate in the fishery; for instance, sale of fresh
and dried white teatfish (Holothuria fuscogilva),
respectively, can fetch an average fisher-to-
buyer price of AU$31 per piece and AU$61 per
kg in Fiji (2014 data) and AU$9 per piece and
AU$39 per kg in Kiribati (2011 data) (Purcell
et al., 2016). Other livelihood options available
in rural areas may be relatively more stable
(e.g. production of copra), but are a far less
lucrative source of income. Hence, when sea
cucumber stocks collapse or the fishery closes
(in many instances, swiftly and without much
warning), this sudden loss of livelihood can lead
to a considerable hardship for many island
inhabitants (Koczberski et al., 2006;
Christensen, 2011).
As well as jeopardising resource management
and income generation efforts, controlling the
incidence of blue boats has also inflicted large
financial and administrative burdens on PICs.
The essential procedures for achieving border-,
human- and biosecurity would entail activities
pertaining to monitoring, capturing and the san-
itary disposing of the boats as well as fair and
humane prosecution, detainment and repatria-
tion of the crew. For instance, Suzanne Lowe-
Gallen, Chief of Compliance and Technical Pro-
jects for the FSM, stated that surveillance and
arrests of nine blue boats that had been illegally
fishing in FSM waters during the past three years
had cost the government over AU$250000
(in PNA, 2016a). Similarly, French authorities
estimated US$1.5 million (~AU$2.1 million) as
the total cost of handling the November 2017
infraction in New Caledonia, with New Cal-
edonia’s representative to the Western and Cen-
tral Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)
Manuel Ducrocq being quoted as saying:
‘For 12 crew members, we are obliged by the
French law to see that they are accompanied by
15 police officers… So not only do we have the
cost of surveillance, the interdiction and then
their accommodation but in addition we must
pay 15 return airline tickets for our police to
ensure these people arrive in Vietnam. That is a
huge cost which is borne by the government and
cannot be recovered’ (in Rika, 2017).
The growing risk of blue boats has been met
in the region with strong rhetoric and swift
action. Vietnam is being diplomatically pres-
sured by the PICs to ‘to do more to prevent this
illegal activity’ (see PNA, 2016b). This issue has
been raised at the annual WCPFC meetings
(in both 2016 and again in 2017) where the
Vietnamese delegate was directly confronted
and asked to provide a response. The FFA has
also requested an update on the implementation
of the Vietnamese Prime Minister’s official
directive issued in May 2017, which specified a
range of (Vietnamese) domestic actions to con-
trol the behaviour of its fishing vessels (see
WCPFC, 2018). The WCPFC Executive Director,
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Feleti Teo, confirmed the adversarial sentiment
among the PICs, ‘in the context of the [WCPF]
Commission there has been attempt to link (blue
boats to membership) because, as you know,
most of the blue boats originate from Vietnam
and Vietnam is a cooperating non-member’
(in Carreon, 2017c), implying that the continued
poaching by blue boats could have an effect on
the success of Vietnam’s application to be a
member of WCPFC.
Countries within the Pacific region appear
keen to apply a coordinated approach to the
surveillance and apprehension of blue boats.
Operation Rai Balang is an annual 10-day mari-
time surveillance sweep led by the FFA’s
Regional Fisheries Surveillance Centre and
joined by nine Micronesian and Melanesian
states as well as the aerial and maritime defence
assets of the ‘QUADS’ (Australia, New Zealand,
France and the US); it conducts unannounced
patrols in the EEZs of the PICs and the high seas
(i.e. areas beyond national jurisdiction) to detect
and seize IUU fishing vessels. Expanding from
the primary target of large-scale distant-water
fleets such as purse seiners or long-liners, the
2017 operation was the first of any FFA surveil-
lance operation to support a secondary mission
of searching for, and reporting, blue boats via
air surveillance sorties in the 14.7 million km2
wide patrol area (FFA, 2017a). Three blue boats
were pursued out of the Papua New Guinea
EEZ, which supplemented the results of the
2016 exercise, in which the detection and arrest
of three blue boats was achieved within the
waters of Palau and FSM (FFA, 2016).
The capture of three blue boats in March
2017 near Indispensable Reef, 50 km south of
Rennell Island in Solomon Islands, provides an
example of a coordinated, multi-agency
approach to conducting surveillance and detec-
tion, and ultimately arrest. After receiving a
report of blue boat sighting from a registered
commercial fishing vessel operating in the area,
the FFA, which is headquartered in Honiara,
alerted the Royal Solomon Islands Police
Force, who dispatched a patrol boat the follow-
ing day. The French Government also provided
aerial support upon request of the FFA by
deploying an aircraft from New Caledonia to
Solomon Islands on an emergency basis. With
an updated report from the police and fisheries
authorities based in Santa Ana Island, the
French aircraft was able to locate the boats,
which enabled the patrol vessel to overtake and
board the blue boats. This case has been
heralded regionally as a successful illustration
of multiparty cooperation among local, national
and international actors, as it led to pinpointing
and ultimately apprehending the blue boats and
their crew (Movick, 2017). Since then, FFA con-
vened a special meeting in Brisbane in May
2017 attended by the senior officials of the PICs
to collectively develop a strategic response to
address the broad consequences of border and
resource violations from blue boats as well as to
plan a concerted diplomatic action directed
towards the Vietnamese Government (FFA,
2017b). Two key outcomes explored were the
‘draft Blue Boat Strategy’ and the expansion of
FFA’s mandate to include coastal inshore areas
(Tauafiafi, 2017a). Regarding the latter, with a
region-wide surveillance system already in
place for offshore oceanic fishery resources, this
consolidation of mandate within FFA is
expected to enable a more effective coordination
of blue boat surveillance – a significant proposi-
tion we further elaborate in the subsequent
section as part of the nascent securitisation
narrative.
Securitisation of blue boats
Offering a concept of security that is broad and
generic enough to encompass different sectors
of security (military, economic, societal and
environmental) at the individual-, state- and
international-level, Barry Buzan and Ole
Wæver have argued that there is a genuine
logic to how an issue becomes understood as a
security threat. Constructionist in its epistemol-
ogy, their ‘securitisation framework’ enables an
analysis of the political process by which threats
are constructed and issues are elevated on the
security agenda (Bueger, 2015: 161). According
to this Copenhagen School of thought,
securitisation implies that a particular issue is
successfully claimed as an existential threat
(e.g. a matter of survival) to a certain referent
object (e.g. state sovereignty or community live-
lihoods). Such claims (i.e. ‘speech acts’) are
made by ‘securitising actors’, who typically rep-
resent political elites empowered or authorised
to speak about security (e.g. governments,
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bureaucracies, lobbyists and pressure groups).
In turn, if accepted by a relevant target audi-
ence (e.g. international community), these
claims as a ‘securitising move’ will lead to
legitimising special or ‘emergency’ measures
that would not have otherwise been possible
had the discourse not taken the form of existen-
tial threats. Hence, securitisation is about the
discursive process that justifies taking actions
outside the normal bounds of politics in order
to avert what is perceived as a threatening
development (Buzan et al., 1998).
In the case of blue boats, alarmist language
has already been used to depict the boats them-
selves, the impact of their activities and the
broader dangers they pose. The Director Gen-
eral of FFA, James Movick, preferred to call
them ‘reef robbers’ (Movick, 2017). Blue boats
have also been compared to a ‘thief in the
night’, who enters the home and steals the most
precious possessions (Carreon, 2017a). Another
FFA official remarked, ‘When they go to a reef,
they don’t catch a few [sea cucumbers], they
catch them all. Sea cucumbers need a certain
amount of number to reproduce. Blue boats will
obliterate them from the reefs. They [sea cucum-
bers] will never grow there again’ (in Tauafiafi,
2017a). In this discourse, the imperative to con-
trol the incursions of blue boats is thus conspicu-
ously linked to the referent objects- that is, the
status of the marine resources as finite and under
threat- and then the survival of the coastal com-
munities who depend on those marine resources
for their livelihood and food security (see
Cullwick, 2016; Tauafiafi, 2017b).
Forming part of the speech act, blue boats are
also spoken about in the same breath as mari-
time border security and associated trans-
boundary crimes such as drug trafficking. Papua
New Guinea Fisheries Minister Mao Zeming
stated, ‘It is not just an illegal fishing matter to
be addressed by the [PNG] National Fisheries
Authority. It is a national security issue which
must be raised at the highest diplomatic levels’
(in Albaniel, 2016). Similarly, Viliame
Wilikilangi, a regional security advisor to the
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, confirmed the
disruptive role of blue boats in preserving terri-
torial control of member countries:
‘Our focus on maritime security, which is some-
thing we’ve identified across a number of
countries in the region, is around the issue of
border security and being able to have enough
maritime domain awareness regarding the move-
ment of small craft vessels, fishing vessels in and
out of our various economic exclusion zones …
[For example], Vanuatu has had issues in the
past with yachts coming in with drugs and you
know it is along some of the transshipment
routes from the US to Australia and also to
New Zealand. So, these are concerns we are
really trying to look at and have these reflected
in the policy’ (in Cullwick, 2018).
As such, the sovereign control of maritime
domain has effectively been elevated as another
referent object.
In the current shaping of the blue boat dis-
course, FFA appears to be one of the most vocal
securitising actors, if not the most dominant.
FFA’s core mandate is to assist member coun-
tries to sustainably manage offshore fishery
resources such as tuna and other pelagic fish
stocks located in their EEZs. FFA’s operations,
therefore, do not extend into coastal waters
where the risk of blue boats appears to con-
verge the greatest. Then, why is FFA visibly
active in intervening in the operations of blue
boats? James Movick of FFA explained in a
media interview,
‘We do have a very effective tool in place [refer-
ring to the Regional Fisheries Surveillance Cen-
tre] and we do need to use it, as these are
problems affecting the sovereignty of our coun-
tries, the livelihoods and opportunities that exist
for our own people to harvest these resources …
So we have the responsibility but also the oppor-
tunity of using the regional MCS [monitoring,
control and surveillance] framework’
(in Tauafiafi, 2017b).
Probing further, in representing FFA’s position,
Movick was clear on the new direction required
to ward off blue boat intrusion that centres on
aerial surveillance. He was quoted as saying,
‘They [blue boats] are a particular concern
because they are small wooden vessels that are
not easily detected by our day-to-day activities
and the traditional [radar] tools that we have
built around the industrialised tuna fishery …
Moving forward, this new form of threat will
require us to evolve tools and practices crafted
to local conditions. Aerial surveillance will
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become more vital and be utilized more broadly
than for just enforcing tuna fisheries alone’
(FFA, 2016).
FFA’s deputy Director General at the time, Wez
Norris, also elaborated on the broader vision of
this strategy,
‘It [aerial surveillance] means we will be able to
deploy it around the region in support of when
our members have their patrol boat out at sea
and that is when we get the best value out of
combining that capability … The increased
aerial assistance capacity will broaden our scope
and the impact that we have on a whole range
of issues from the detection of sort of non-tuna
illegal fishing like the blue boats that we have
seen from Vietnam, but also allowing us to over
time and as the members get more comfortable
to move into looking at broader trans-national
crime risks that are not necessarily fisheries spe-
cific … This is where the future I see us having
to move. To understand that there are other bor-
der control issues where our regional [MCS]
framework can play a role’ (in Tauafiafi, 2017c).
Encouraged by the effective response demon-
strated in the capture of blue boats in Solomon
Islands in 2017, the intent of the FFA is report-
edly to seek a full mandate from the member
countries to expand its operation to coastal
waters (see Tauafiafi, 2017a,2017b). Such an
extension, if approved, would enable the
agency to monitor the territorial waters of PICs
with greater frequency and intensity and even
deploy foreign aircrafts into the country on an
emergency basis. While this would be a highly
sensitive proposal from a sovereignty perspec-
tive, if not an outright aberration, it likely builds
on a precedence called the 2000 Biketawa
Declaration in the Pacific, which sets out a
regional framework that allows a collective
intervention into domestic affairs in times of
political or security crisis and gives the extra
power to the Pacific Island Forum (the preemi-
nent inter-governmental body made up of heads
of state) in determining when and how that
takes place (Frazer and Bryant-Tokalau, 2006).
FFA’s aspiration is in some ways also tied to a
securitising move of Australia, who as a metro-
politan partner and the largest donor of foreign
aid to the Pacific region launched a plan to
boost the aerial surveillance capacity of FFA in
2017. This support, for the first time, added a
(civilian) patrol aircraft under the direct opera-
tional control of the FFA, who will have year-
round access to the feature with FFA members
determining surveillance priorities (see Brady,
2017; Radio New Zealand, 2017b). It is also
aimed at strengthening the ‘communication and
cooperation’ capability in addition to the origi-
nal objective of surveillance and monitoring
(see Tauafiafi, 2017c). For Australia, this initia-
tive represents a new model of support with an
estimated annual cost of AU$10–15 million
being funded as part of the new AU$2 billion
dollar Pacific Maritime Security Program
supported by the Australian Department of
Defence (Brady, 2017; Department of Defence,
2018). In this way the initiative would allow the
programme to formally link with Australia’s
Defence Cooperation Program, which is respon-
sible for the security and stability of a larger
geographical area that comprises not only the
Pacific Islands region, but also Southeast Asian
nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines and Timor Leste (see Tauafiafi, 2017c).
Though inconclusive at time of writing, there
are indications that PICs are accepting the new
reality of their coastal waters as being under
threat from blue boats, a reality that is socially
constituted by the speech acts of various
regional and national actors in the last few
years. Following the well-publicised incident in
their waters last year, the Solomon Islands Gov-
ernment, for instance, formed a high-level
cross-sectoral task force to deliberate on the
ways to enhance interagency cooperation and
coastal community alertness. A national strategy
to deal with blue boats is also being led by the
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
together with other ministries (R. Masu, pers.
comm., 2018). In countries where no official
sighting of blue boats has yet been docu-
mented, there is an admission that this issue
requires close watch. Tokelau’s fisheries officer,
Feleti Tulafono, cautioned, for example,
‘Whilst their transgressions may be occurring
half a world away from Tokelau, our immediate
neighbours Samoa, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Cook
Islands are now concerned with this new threat
that a strong and vigorous public awareness
campaign should be developed’ Tauafiafi,
2017a).
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Discussion: Wider implications and research
agenda
In many PICs, customary marine tenure pro-
vides the foundations for the rights that coastal
people have in deciding how their marine
resources are used and managed. It is these
foundations upon which community-based
forms of management have persisted and gained
traction as the principal mode (and scale) in
which coastal fisheries should be governed in
the Pacific region (Johannes, 2002; Govan
et al., 2006; SPC, 2015). Yet, there are some
enduring and emerging issues that community-
based management alone may not be able to
address. In the face of globalisation and increas-
ing demand for resources, it is useful to exam-
ine one such governance challenge and its
intricate connections with larger political-
economic and geographical trends (Howitt
et al., 2013), which we illuminate using the
case of ‘blue boats’ in the Asia Pacific.
This paper has analysed some of the early
speeches and actions of national and regional
actors visible in the public communicative
domain to explore how the recent phenomenon
of blue boat incursion is being positioned
within the maritime security discourse in the
Pacific Island region. Based on the initial evi-
dence gathered for this purpose, we posit that
blue boats and their poaching activities are
being devised as a fresh means to strengthen
regional awareness, cooperation and capacity
for maritime security. The main novelty of blue
boats arguably stems from their small, rudimen-
tary and even ungovernable characteristics.
Such attributes pose a different set of security
challenges compared to large-scale industrial
fleets, who tend to be technically more detect-
able (via VMS and on-board observers), admin-
istratively traceable (via vessel registration,
catch reporting and audit trails) and politically
recognisable (via ties to lobbyists, industries and
high-level diplomacy). The incursion of blue
boats thus invites a new way of approaching
the topic of maritime security in the region. Spa-
tially, it adds a coastal dimension that repre-
sents a vast shore-based area nearly impossible
to oversee using centralised means and conven-
tional radar. There is also a degree of informal-
ity and randomness associated with these boats
and their crew. In order to respond to the
changing conditions of threats that demand
finer resolution yet broad coverage, the regional
dialogue has so far emphasised multilateral
aerial surveillance capacity together with the
involvement of fishers themselves, community-
based actors and provincial authorities to report
local sightings (see Fig. 1; also Song, 2015 on
the idea of ‘civilian scouts’). Blue boats are
therefore bolstering the need for closer coopera-
tion not only among governments and agencies
but also including the dispersed, informal actors
residing at lower and resource user-levels to
create a greater network of interdependencies.
From this, we aver that tackling blue boats is
becoming the newest extension of the regional
maritime security apparatus. Aside from the
added security challenges, its securitisation
(as with any intentional political endeavour)
would also present opportunities for increasing
influence for those willing to act vocally and
decisively to negotiate the risks. The recent
activities have shown that FFA and Australia, in
particular, have swiftly (and in part jointly)
engaged with the issue – a securitising move
from which these actors may derive certain
organisational and strategic benefits in years to
come. Both the Australia’s 2016 Defence White
Paper and the 2017 Foreign Policy White
Paper, which reaffirm enhanced commitment to
safeguarding maritime security in the Pacific, as
well as the latest consensus among PICs to
expand the Biketawa Declaration to incorporate
the non-traditional security topics including
fisheries and human and environmental security
(i.e. a Regional Security Declaration to be
known as the Boe Declaration), provide a wider
political backdrop which would favour the con-
tinued salience of blue boats in the security
discussion.
In coming years, the actual events of the blue
boat incursion may cease due to the changing
macro and micro economic conditions motivat-
ing the fishing trips as well as the controlling
effort of the Vietnamese Government and/or the
effective deterrence from the Pacific actors. For
instance, the recent warnings of the European
Union to ban Vietnamese seafood imports has
prompted the Vietnamese Government to dem-
onstrate some progress in curbing IUU fishing
of its offshore fleets (L. Son, pers. comm., 2018).
Yet, as long as the threat itself is maintained to
persist, there will be a lingering appetite for a
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security discourse and the ensuing surveillance
practice. The nature of smaller fishing vessels is
such that they are more difficult to track and
account for, with a vast number of them origi-
nating from numerous landing sites stretched
across the Asia–Pacific. Hence, it is perhaps
not entirely unthinkable that there could be a
‘Chinese version’ of the blue boats appearing in
the Pacific Islands at some point in time (see
also Wong, 2016). In recent decades, influx of
Chinese loans, aids and infrastructure develop-
ment has been a noticeable trend in the region
(Shie, 2007; Zhang and Lawson, 2017) and
arguably a contentious topic for the metropoli-
tan countries such as Australia and
New Zealand in fear of losing diplomatic,
economic and even naval influence over PICs
(Windybank, 2005). While how much of the
Chinese influence should amount to a security
concern is unknown (and in fact not directly
essential for discussion in this paper), it might
be worth keeping in mind the contemporary
history of fishing boat expansion in China, their
frequent incursions in the nearby seas of dis-
puted or foreign jurisdiction such as the Yellow
Sea and the South China Sea, as well as their
alleged dual role as a para-military unit (Dupont
and Baker, 2014; Zhang and Bateman, 2017).
Thus, with potential to grow into a more flam-
mable international relations issue, the threat
the small transboundary fishing boats pose
could be of enduring concern to those
Figure 1. A ‘blue boat’ poster
produced for the Solomon Islands in
2017, which can be replicated for other
countries, and eventually in the local
languages. Source: SPC (2017). [Colour
figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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addressing maritime security in the Pacific
Island region.
Research on this topic would support the
wider trends observed in maritime security stud-
ies. According to Bueger and Edmunds (2016),
maritime security issues are increasingly
characterised by interconnectivity across scales
and sectors transcending traditional boundaries
and jurisdictional responsibilities. This means
that the future study agenda requires critical
and expanded attention to the ways security
cooperation have become more diffuse, com-
plex and diverse involving state, private and
other non-state actors, including local fishing
communities, as well as a holistic approach to
deal with different but interlinked forms of mari-
time crimes and risks. Furthermore, the issues of
port security, illegal fishing or environmental
degradation remain particularly underexplored.
Calling for ongoing in-depth studies that employ
more sociological and interdisciplinary observa-
tions (Bueger and Edmunds, 2016; Song et al.,
2017), the research on the blue boats and their
security implications can represent a useful con-
tribution to the maritime security praxis and
debate that ultimately affects how we view and
evaluate the oceans, and the transboundary per-
formances within.
Our initial sense-making of the blue boat
phenomenon raises a crucial set of questions for
future empirical research, which include but are
not limited to:
• What are the (geo)political, economic and
historical developments including climate
change that constitute domestic push factors
that encourage or compel Vietnamese and other
boats and crew to venture into the Pacific? Also,
what are the fishers’ internal logic and liveli-
hood concerns that directly affect their motiva-
tions and agency with respect to transboundary
fishing work?
 How has the Vietnamese Government’s
position on the blue boats evolved, what have
been their stated responses and actions, what
have they achieved and what are the opportuni-
ties and limitations of their control, if any?
 What are the perceptions of various
regional actors in the Pacific and their
organisational responses on this issue (including
the national ministries of PICs and those of
Australia as well as inter-governmental bodies
and independent experts)? How do their
understandings and priorities vary in terms of its
security implications, and why? What effect
does this issue have on regional cooperation or
the ‘Pacific Regionalism’ ethos?
 How can the claimed linkage of blue boats
with larger-scale and arguably more sinister
problems of corporate IUU fishing, transnational
shipment of illicit goods and sea slavery and
human rights violation be validated? What
should be done to reduce such risks and make
the undertaking of small fishing boats more gov-
ernable? Should ‘desecuritisation’ be the goal
(i.e., shifting of issues back into the mundane,
normal bargaining processes without the need
for emergency measures), and if so, how?
We anticipate all this should help gain a
more accurate and comprehensive grasp on this
relatively new and under-identified phenome-
non. Identifying the sources of the issue, context
and reactions and how these mesh into domi-
nant narratives to produce the ongoing out-
comes should be the collective endeavour of a
wide range of actors in the region, namely all
those concerned with the provision of food,
identity, and sovereignty that coastal waters
confer upon the people of the Pacific Islands.
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